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The Bohavioriatic Tondoncy in Psycholo^zy.
During i locturo at tho University of Illinois in Novam^or of
ninotoon hundred thirteen. Sir -Villiafn Ramsey made tho statement
that just now tho sciencos are on a very unstable basis. Old beliefs
are being destroyed, and new theories are being formulated. \Vhat
has been accepted as basic -md fimdamental is undergoing revision,
the voyy nature of physics, of chemistry, of bioloQr, anci of astron-
Oiuy is being recast. The physicists are not sure of matter; the
chemists ire looking deeper th'-m the electron; the astrunomors are
telling us that the moon does not revolve around the earth.
As might be expected, psychology' is not exempt from this
chanei.ng process. Its fundamentals are being torn to pieces. The
whole subject -imtter is being criticised severely; its methods con-
demned; its Yory aim and point of view declared worthless and in
dire need of chuige. CQnaciovianess and introspoQtiQn are being
rejected and behaviori sm is taking their place. The motor, active,
behaving phases of life are being emphasized to the exclusion of
other aspects; there is no other adequate point of view, declare
some exponents of the new movement.
ir. There is nothing essentially new being ex^^ounded by the be-
haviori sts. The forces at work on psycholojpj^ to-day are fundament-
ally the forces that have attacked its dicta in the past. As then,
so now, they are opposed by other forces as powerful as themselves.
On one side is p^'ogressivism; on the other conservatism. On the
one side is monism; on the other dualism.. The tendencies now are not
identically those of previous iges, tho essentially they are. The
jp regressive tendency of one age may be the conservative one at a
[Later period. They are n:^ned in relation to tho problem att-icked.

and th'it problom shifts as the subject devolops. Betwoon tho two
opposin
.
tondoncios, tho, the scienco is hullt up, dovolopod, --md
organized.
The debate irose first over the question of tho soul. It ;/ould
bo instructivo to reviev/ that v/hole argument, did not tho limits of
this paper prohibit it. The controversy wis at its hei^jit from the
time of the early Greek philosophers until about the time of Descartes
near the middle of the seventeenth centurjr. Ho proposed tlie autom-
ata ^hich made the body but a reflex m»achine. His views did not
decide the question, altho the controversy subsided after his the-
ory was proposed.
After tilts, a dispute arose as to the relation of the mind to
the body. Descartes had opened a Tsay out of the former difficulty;
but, as Dessoir^ points out, his theon; still presi-imed a mind, a con-
sciousness. The nature of the connection between body and mind becain(
a subject for debate. Paraljelism and interaction! sm ^voro proposed
and are still being discussed, as is evidenced by the recent attempt
of farren^to justifV interactionism. The discussion of tho soul
practically ended //hen Descartes proposed his theory -vhich disregard-
ed it. '^11 the dispute about mind end by its being neglected?
Infill consciousness cease to function as something essential in the
study of man? There are those who no.v advocate disregarding it;
there are those, too, who /ould assort that it does not exist.
That they are essentially »yronH, is the contention of this discussion.
\s the existence of soul -md mind have been so bitterly
attacked, anytliing dependent upon them must have been subjected to
criticism. Introspection bears such a relation to consciousness,
and has been attacked as being a method that does not bear the
ear-marks of scientific exactness. Those who belittle conscious-

nass must roject introspection; but it is '^Iso criticisod hy soir.o
N.iO accopt tlio mind. Fr.m Horhi>'t on, iao schools h'lve ot)posod o-ich
othor; ono >ioUeving in int rospoction , tho other- hcliGving only in
pufoly ohjoctivc mothods. Tho lattor* school .v.as influonced du^in/^
the seventoonth ^d eighteenth centuries hy mathematical md statis-
tical methods, and hy tho methods of tho natural sciences. During
the nineteenth centur^r, beginning Jith Bessel, #ehor, -and Fochner,
physical science hogan to oxert an effect. More recently, a bio-
logical influence has manifested itself.
It must not be supposed that the intr'ospective school v/as un-
influenced by tiie exact methods of these other sciences. The adhe^'-
ents began to work under experimental conditions, md even to use
objective methods in those fields of investigation that permitted
it; i.e.
,
Rbbinghaus in memorj^. Still, the characteristic feature
of the introspective met.iod was not changed; nor did its opposers
relax their opposition to it. It is one of the bones of contention
of present day discussions.
The methods of psychology,' have be on influenced by physics,
biolog',', natural science, aiid mathematics. The m-iniier of interpret-
ation of facts, also, has been subjected to influence from other
studies. Physiolog^^ furnished ihe objectives 7/ith their inter;jrQt-
ations to a la^ge extent. Des.^oi r*' notes that Descartes emphasized
the physiological in the mtter of associations—tho his beliefs
were tinged mth old iirystic beliefs. Hartley explained association
by the flow of a supposed nervous fluid. Carbonis, (rait, Lotze, and
Helmholtz take their cue from physiology and its teachings regarding
the re ^vous system. The influence came in im ways. First, the
actual or supposed facts were seized upon as foundations for ex-
planations. Second, the development of ohysiolo.sy could not help

4but ''ovoal tho intnc'^to rnochajus/n of tho human body; and in conso-
quoiico, inoch^iistic
,
mechanical, autuinalic thecios arose, Descartes
leading the school
,
It would be natural and logical to suppose that such theories
would emphasize bohavior--the activity of the human machine--pos-
sibly to the excli sion of other phases of life, or tho absorption
of them in behavior. In this way, motor theories have developed.
The motor, mechanistic theories ^which apply to the mind-body relat-
ionship, and to the niture of consciousness have been mentioned al-
ready, and nofii not be discussed further in this paper. In as much
as they precede the present day move:f.ent toward vie\ving all psycho-
log},' from the motor point of view, other theories v/ill be conside^-ed
to some extent.
[[[. According to Titchener, the forerunners in mentioning and dis-
cussing the import mce of motor activity were Comte (l£3£),
Cournot (l£51), Lange (I86c), and Maudsley (1667 j. In Ainerica,
accordin^^; to Pillsburj^, moto»' theories go back only to James, and
the James-Lange theory of emotion.
This last theory explains emotions as being a result of the
movements of the body. Emotions take their color from sensations
arising in contracting imiscles. This theory is based, partly, upon
the pathelogical discovery that people whose body nuscles are
functionless
, or nearly so, have few or no emotions. Supporting this
theory, Halleck^ adds , "Emotions will arise if (one) goes through
the appropriate muscular* movements."
Feelings^ are explained by three general theories: the Evo-
lutionary, the Experience, and the Furtherance-hindrance. The last
one is a motor theo r^r maintained by Dewey and Stout. Judd^says the
disagreeable feelings are due to a conflict of motor tendencies.

b[dois, too, h'lvo >ioori oKpl-ii. ' od in tonns of actAon. ^coo'^dlng
to PllL^hu''y^ Pain oi*l.<ln-ilod this expl ui-\ti.ori. "Vi idoi," says
Hillock^ "ilvws Iiis I /noto'* elomont, hovvovo-', o>>sour'r3." [t. ;nay Vio
in incipiorit rnovomo/it : tromoi' in i iiiuscle, o^ tii-^ 'iGtioa of i ^-O ind.
^,r\ngO'''^notos thit movomont^ \nd ido-\s ^ooomo connootoi only ^ftT*
•apoit.-)! iction. Diinlap 3\y3 that thoijght T.l^iys has a ;noto'' tona-
oncy. Ladd assorts thxt, imleso iahi^utod, movomont.^ al vays follovV
mental 3tat-)s. Bal d vi/i^ /nt33
,
"Evoo/ 3t ito of consoiousnoss tonds
to 'vralizo it3<^lf in an appfopt'iato /mascnl loovomont. " ;Jono of the
al^ovo statement.-? '-eal^y mike /notion the rjiuso of ideation in the s-^re
sense in ^yiiich motion vas involved in the explanation of eiriotions,
lliey do, though, lead us to suspect that they a'"e but an interned late
step leading to a foal luotof' explanation of tho idea. That expla-
nation is hT*e no.v, and irakes the idea the --esult of laoveinent.
"In orief* to hi- e the idea cold , one inust act cold
,
"r^ecently as30''ted
P'^ofesso'' ^ode.
in speakin-^ of thought, Thorndike says, "3ome thinker's asser^t
that vithout bodily rnovements, controlled thought cannot take place.
••'It is cei'tain that the indirect contributions of :novements to
thoughts ani feelings is a large one, and one upon ?7hich man '•elies
for* the mate fill fof so!:ie of his important judgments."
Attention has received various ex ol -mat ions . Mill eraohasized
tne intensity of the stiioalus. Ribot says that moto'' ^nani test at ions
constitute attention. Munste'-be'^g has his incipient mote theory
whicii makes movement necessary for attention. Rain inte-'pfets at-
tention as a mental state caused by feeUngs .vnich are controlled by
move.ments. Horyicz emphasizes feeUngs. Lipps liiakes attention a
mental activity of a nof^e spif'itual natuf*e thaii o^dinan/^ mental
states. For Sully, it is a mental activity like other' ;onsGiou3

3t-\t.is., Fo'* Kohn, ittontlon is I'lonric-il vilfi consol •)tJsnos3.
.vith Ko'ui, but inolndos olo/r.onls f^orr. xll tno otho'' thoori os. 01"
'\H tiiodo lino taoo-'ioss ^^Iiic'i hv/o ^00J1 .<-;ivon it t.-io fisk oi' 'no-
litiiig t'lo T'vv of unity), thfeo <3tn-h--\si zo movomont. Ono of thoso,
onty, is i •'oal jnoiO'"* OKolin-itlun ^--t'r^t o'''Lr5Ln-xt.od by Hibot.
Illusions of Afoi.^ht iro oxpl\inod '-y Judd on tho b^sis of pre-
vious /flusGuHf sotting. Rhythm, ho s\\'S, is Hg'*oo--\^lo bof;-\uso it i.-
gr-oos An.m tho r«tto of cof't-iLn boiily (novoinonts. H'\''iaony is of
inoto'* 0''igin -iiid not of sonsof*;/.
<V. v^i IXrke 3Lagh=i/ii his -i motor theory of molody, bisoi upon
somo oxpoi'lmonts ho pO''fo'*mod. He vfitos as folIo//s, "iho unity(of
a melody) a^nses not from t:iO tones themselves: it is cont '•ibutod by
ict of the listono''. ^/hon tone follo^/s tone in .".uch a inanner that
tho hoa'^e^* caii i^eact adojuat. oly to each, .vhen the response to the
suocossive members of the ser'ie.i is not a series of sopai^ate o^* con-
flicting acts, but ('-ttho'' i i each Inst mco only a continuation or
fuftiiO'* elaboration of an act al ^'eady ?ioing for^a^d, then the tones
are not felt as discete, separate, indeoondent, but as '^elated'
to each other, \iid vhen, finally, t ie series of tones comes to such
a close that ,yhat has been a continuous act of f'osponse is also
brought to a definite completion, the balanced ioi;scular 'resolution'
..•<ives r'iso to tho feeling of finality, and the sof'ies is recognized
as a unity, a /hole, a melody,"
Soace oofceoti on has boon exolained by the movements of the
eyes. Halleck hoMs that sensaiions arising ffom tho muscles that
move tie eyes aid us in po receiving ti-i-diinensional objects at tfie
proper* distance. Lad;i agr'eos vlth Hareck. Thorndiko^says that the
feeling of exte^'nal relati .msiiips is simply the feeling of eye move-

— =
^
y]
monts. Rorkloy'' iris tho first to oxolain sp^ce in this /mnnor.
Wot ^11 tho motor axolariatio)i3 h-^ve hoen notod; hut onoij/^ hwe
boon givon to indicate tho r^/iii fi cations of tho tendoncy. No osycho-
logica] fiold is exompt. /Oiorover ono is neoded, a motor explanat-
ion is found among tho others adv-^C id.
It mif^ht "bo jrofitablo to discuss the opposing theories. In
tlio case of attention and of feeling, they m'^Q enumerated to show
the relative proportion of motor to non-motor explanations, and a
ratio of ono to throo, respectively, -vas found in the tv/o cases.
This is not to bo consiaered as true of every field; it is merely
indicative of the fact that motor explanations in general a-'o in the
minority. Probably, the J uries-Lan^:e theory of emotion is the one
most vsridelv acceotod at the ore sent time. It has its opoononts,
hov/evor. Dunlap points out that emotions persist after movement is
completed. So each other theo^'y might be criticised he^'o, but to
do 30 .voula not further the discussion. Instead, -e shall content
ourselves vath criticisms of the whole tendency.
Lotzo said th it "in no case does the soul bring the movement
about; (but) psychical states. . .are. . .the occasj^ion of the bodily
movements." His statement is typical of the views of the non-motor-
ists. For destructive citicism of the motorist's point of view,
Pillsbury has contributed the best—if not the only—argument.
Coming from a psychologist recognized as a behaviorist, his remarks
a^'o the mo '0 telling. He asks if there are movements enough, suf-
ficiently accurate and discriminatod , to supply all the qualities
kno\wn. The area of greatest sensitivity in the eye, as //undt has
shown, is in tho region where no movement is necessary. Judd and
McAllister, too, have shown that one is constmtly making unappre-
ciated oyo*novoment3 which ou^ht to result in iiieaning for us, on the

motor* Ihoon/, siiico thay i<'o ,*^f*e''ite»' tir-in ihe .-iiovo/ae/it s tho oyo rn'.kai
Nhon discn. mln-iting t:iG smallest sp-icos. Iho motorists ittrl>into
co)isoiou3no3 J to tho motor aroas, despite tho f ict that J-unos,
Mtlnst arber,! , and Fer-'iar co/ivincod the world tv/onty years a^-o that
siich a theon' is unteriahlo. besides, Gushing, .vorkiiip; dL'V3ctly on
the motor areas, found no rich conscious nrooessos resultint^ 'Ihe
motor explanation of recognition leaves one in as :r;uch perplexity as
tho motorists assort is inherent in tiie otiier types of theories. It
does not tel"' us how wo roco^mizo tho little differences in act-
ion which are supposed to give us different liie-anings of things, ihe
fliotor YiQN of selection depends upon the openness of a way out:
hut su jh a theory stops too soon. As to -vhich set of muscles ^11 be
ready to respond seems to depend entirely upon chance. Selection
by chance is hardly selection.
Pillsburj-'s criticisms are too weighty to bo lightly cast
aside. Motorists and bohiviorists must ansvver them. Of course,
Ath Jual, wo iiiust remember "that there is a universal relation
between consciousness and bodily activity (.vJ-iichj can... be fully
established. Tho structure of the nervous system from hyara to man
is such that thero is al^iys a motor organ linked #ith evory sen-
3or\^ org-an." Facts of physiology we recognize, whether we a^ree
,?ith Judd's GoncT sion that "this fact is enough, even if t ie-'o
v?ere no striking introspective indie ttions of tho Linport -imco of
inovement, to concent rae ihe attention of tho psychologist upon the
moto" si io of tho nervous process,"
[V. Tho latest development from these motor theories is the develop-
ment of a .'notor system of psychology/. Four books, each a"* most
.vholly different from the others, the fo-'orun ers in the new
field: Pi 1 1 shrry ' s , ^^ssontials of ?syGholog.y (1911); MacDougall 's.

9Psychology (ril2j; P-innel oo' s , Tho Scionco of Huifi-in Roh-r'Loi" {^'V2);
'Jlf*it3on' s , Bi^'-ivLor' (1114). Tfioy prosonL i hr md of psyc;iology i/iit
L3 oiicr'outly deaignated --is holiavlorlstLC.
A study of thoijo l^ooks lad t!ie porlodlc-il UtTr-itura bo iling
on the subjoct .vill revo-^l tho -idviiicris In this no^ typo of psycho-
lo^/ , -^d the cTiiins ir\ e by t vi beh-wlorists. Rather t.vm t \kQ
oioh book sopir* ttely , -vo sh ill dlscnss topics mi endeavui' to see
just wnat the system Is Tike.
First 70 foiast mon Nhit the )oint of view is, and that vo vill
go', from the definitions iven for psychology/. "Psychol O;^^/- may be
32.
defined as tho sclonco of iiuman behavior," says ^illsbury . "fe may
then define jsvcholo-^y as the oositive .science of the ^ehavlor of
living tnings," writes MacDougall. "Most if not all of psychology
...(is beliavior), for .most If not all of mental ... phenomena can be
reduced to terms of behavior , " is Parmolee*s formulation. .Vatson's
is essentially the same as these, but his ^vo^ding is mu.cn more ox-
plicit \nd definite. He says
,
"Psychol og,y as the beha^dori st ^^L ews it
is a purely objective exporimental branch of natural science. .. Its
theoretical ;?oal Is tiie pr-idlctlon and control of behavior. Intro-
spection forms no essential part of Its methods, nor is the scien-
tific vaVie of its dat t dependent upon the readiness vvlth vliich they
lend tneraselves to interpretation in erms of consciousness. The
bohaviori;st attempts to get \ unitary scheme of animal rogponse.
He roGo^ni ^es no dividing line bot^veon man and brute. The behavior
of -can, fldth all of its refinement and complexity, for»ns only n part
of hi. 3 total field of investigation."
The conmon terms in these definitions is behavior. Before vve
unjer'stand the definitions, we .-r-ust seek a meaning for t'us Yord.
PiUsbury defines It as follows, "^eliavior -nust Include ovo'^ything

—^ —: ^
from tho SL nplost mo^'omont..^ of vilkl-i,^'; or of tl n.- '.>!* 1 u/^^ l;io jon lo
tha 'icti. vlties invvjlvod In s'nyLU--< in iu;iienGO hy spooc'i or in
cai'i^ying to completion some g'vo-it en InQer'l -u;^ wk. Co-'t-iln of tho
vory simplest lots, sncii ai? jyi. nkin.^^ ini ot'ier r-ofloxocj, ve filr'ly
.vithia tho r-^nge of physi. oloi^^ . But ev,^ti -i he^je 'm^f. bo t^ken mtu
consi -ter' \ti on by psycholoj^ists , ^^oc iuse tlie most oomolioatod vX
ha understood only ihon malyzed into Its -iomponents 'U\ii-^h iro closo-
ly rol itad to 'afloxGs." fvKcDoug'iH^^s^ys , "iH/o moanfby boh ivioc^ that
(living things) seam to have an int rinsio povver of sol f-deter» cination
and to oursue ictivalv or /TlUi effort thair om ivolfara uii their
omi ends o^* pur.josas, •• •Behavior is the c i traatori stic of living
things." Watson Lncluies undor the term all tho acts of tha animal,
all Koveiiionts of any kind ^hatsoavo'". Ho clas jifias thaso acts into
explicit -ind implicit behavior. Uncio" ihe u rst a^e p''aced al ' tha
ordinary acts of li>ang things. Thesa again a-'e divided into immed-
iato md dol iyad resj^onsos, according to the time eleinent of the
response la ralatio/i to tha stiaialus. Under* tho second division,
the implicit cLaoS, he places the liahits of speech, as he cal"'3 them.
This pa-*ticular hehivior is peculi ir of :..an alone. "The fandamental
diiference hetA-een la-an and animals f^^Ofn our point oi viOvV lies in
the fact tnat the human being can form habits la the throat." Ha
says furtno'*, "If implicit behavior can be sliOvvn to consist of noth-
ing but ,vora move.nents, the bohaviof of the huia-an ^-eing as a .^hola
is as open to objective control tha behavior of tho lo.vast org-iii-
ism." His opi :ion as to ^vhat tha uabit of speech is, is /ell ex-
pr'esviod in the folio -ving quotation: "'io advance tho a'^.^ijjnent , which
•ve admit is hi.-^ly speculative, we ,/ill suppose that future inalysis
.vill enable us ultifGately to sho^v that eyo''y vo^^d, sylli^le, and
letter vvhathac spok^en or thought, pf'oduces a ciiaracteristic form of

rosponso jvhich, wiiori i*8c:0'*dorl , inuat 'He "i.ookad at from i lie sv.no .^Vxrid-
jomt ^lich .va 'ido )t vvhon lookin^i^ -^t liaMts el sawher-o. • • • En tho aoino
^\y YO should ho ihlo to datonuino inan's l.-^igiiV->o h'-il^its, vh it hahits
i'*a ^OLJ'ig ucjod \t tiia tlined.o., .7h\t tliouglit o'-ocessas ara ^^oirii^ on),
ate." \s to vvharo ^a shall look for t.'iLs hahivior, he ciiys^,' "'Iha
larnyx, I haliavo. Is tha sait of most of those phanoniena, " Undar
t::is class ha Includes al.^o f. n^^rer ,hand, and l^ody tf'einors. Ya-'kas
says of '^ahT'ior that "tha tarm...is uic"'uslva not maraly of those
gross and obvious iv lvitlas exhibited ^y inan In coimnon ;/ith other
aiil/nils, >^ut of hidden org-viic processes." Colvin and Bagley in th^
;
recant educaiio i psychology define he?PV'ior as "all activiries of anij i
al forms from amoaha to m-an, including the simplest niovajnants like
contraction, >>r3--iihing, winking of --m eye, and iha most complex
activities like composing -an add ''ess or painting a picture."
All of these definitions agreo fairly veil in makiag >>ehavLor
Inciusiva not on"'v of conduct, hut of all muscular -mi gl-^ndular
activity. Aj )lvin^? tils daflnition to tha oravious definition of
psychology, /a unda'^stand ^attar /hit tha bohaviorists me-m. Psy-
chology is tha science of "hahavior. Behavior Is -iny mujcular and
gl'Vidular activity. Psycholog}/, than, from the beh-:iyioristic point
of view, is tha scianca of jnuscular -md gl mdular activity, explicit
and implicit. Its ai/n, as tha quotition from vatson has pointed out
already, is the prediction -^nd control of behavlor--of conduct and
of implicit activity.
This datinition irakes psycholo^^"- a stud'^ of rosults. //hat
IS the bohavlorl Stic attitude toward causes? Titcfiener, criticising
an article vyritten by fatson, points out that behavior i i its final
malysis Is a matte'' of physical -^d chemical causation.
Consciousness plays a r-ither uncertain part in tills ne# scheme.

Pinneleo 3\ys, "Consoi /uanocis o^clsts >vhonovo'* "hohivlor Is Lnfiuonced
by idois 0'' "^^y faoUrv^s." His daflnttlon of con3CLOUf5no33--=i vv^uo
ono.to s ly tho Ie--i3i;--i3 as folljws, "Gorisclousnos s is -i coinjlax
pi'ocoss ;;ndo up of feelings and idoas vhich a-'e unified ^-^y thti aenae
of \ pe'^iJOii lUty ^iiicli fn-\v 'viiJ:in as -x v^^^ue feoling, but viiichi be-
comes i I courao of time cTe ir—i^ut . " "G jnsoi jusnes!^ is boiv-tvior ,
"
wites Sin^^O'*; vho says fiirther that he would bogin '/ith the .vorld
•md const '•uct in act of consciousnoss, rather than construct the
wo^ld out of consciousness. P^^ille'' suggests that Singer ;fie?-ins that
consciousnes } is genorated by a moticm of bram particles, as
molecular motion goner ti,es heat. Frost says that for scientific
purposes, consciousnoss miy be disregarded. Ho substitutes in its
stead a consqi ousizi ig process. Praising Titchener's definition of
psychologv' ^^ecause it makes consciousness a process, he takes a cue
from it and coins this nev phrase to clear up the difficulties pre-
sented in the old term, and, presujiiably , to harmonize the t-vo op-
posiiig factions. He explains his term as follo'jys? "Hlnerg^^ is stored
i-'t some Tiodified fashion by expofienco; it is put into action by
the stiimalus no^v affecting the org-^mism, its result i s to ;nodify the
machinery of ^ehavior in ter^ms of that past experience." Keflex
action, intelligent action, and habitual action, under this catyerory,
become, respectively, p^e-consciousi zing, conscious! zing, and ijon-
sciousized behavior. Apparently not content -vith introducing one
^
vague tof'm into osy-^jhology , in a l ater article iie int^'oduces the tent
Bet-^-^rq to take ttie place of consciousness, '^at that means is ex-
plained as follo-vs: an Alpha- a>\-^ is the name of the simple sensori-
motor path invol^-ed in a nenrous response to a stlinulus. ^ut from
this a''c a se:jond one, the Beta-arc, may ^ro to tiie associative areas
of the cortex. Ml tiiis is a very elaborate 'and ingenious sub-
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stitulij . of tar'riis for conoopts .vith Mnoh m x -o f'o-idy fi-niU i''.
Frost t-^Icos conaol'ition in m eKtract from m QQS\y Nritien
y>y JaT.as (posthuinousl.y pubHshr)d) on tho luestlon, "Doos Conaoiousnoai
exist?" Tho iOxtrarjt is as follO'.7S, "For twenty year-j past [ havo
mistnistod .lonsolousnas-s as an entity; Tor se^j-en O'* oi fht years
pajt [ ha^''0 311^^ osted to irr/ students its non-exi stonco. • • • It no;/
800(113 to me that the hour is rioe for ii to be o ;enly and unlversal-
ly disc if'ded.
"
are not voiy clear, after readin^^ these deflai lions ind
statejaents about consciousness, as to //hat the hehaviori st ic ^iev is.
In no case does the theory make mi ch difference in the subject matter
for tie one :vho holds it. Altho not Uterally true, //o laav say that
the behavioristic attitude toward consciousness is one of neglect.
The method to >^e pursued in the solution of the problems pre-
sented aro determined, naturally, by tho point of vie^v assumed. If
consciouoness is denied O'' neglected, methods dependent Ui)on it must
be r»eplaced i^y pu''ely objective methods of the natuf'al sciences.
3t=iting each beh iviorist * s vie-vs of introspection may give us more
of m in light into their respective ideas about consciousness than
their formal statements would offer, as well as add to our knovledgo
of tiie behavioristic procedu^'o. Pa.'melee sa-s
,
"Introspect ion* • •
must always be an important source of information vith regard to
mental phenomena, but t do not belief that the study of mental
phenomena c-in beooine dioroly scientific until the inethod is in tho
fttain objective. Introspection on the part of most peo^Ae reveals
images at the basis of all ideas ind of all thinking. -The Intro-
spective met lod is of g<*eat value at this point as thro^ving light
upo.j the origin and nature of these phenomena." Pills^^ury's positia/
is i'.di Gated in this extract, "Introspection is no more difficult or
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unco'^t iLn th-in is tho obso'-vitioM of oxto^'n il ohono/nona. • • 'The rosutt
from ^oth inothod^ should ho, and aro, i ho same, oxct3pt th-it ono .vlll
suit somo orohlams , irid tho otho-', so.-ne otho'- p^ohi ems. " MicDuugall
assert that Lntrospoctiori gives "the indesoensahl e p''oU;ninary do-
sc'Uption of ooiisciousiiesj O'' ;nodei; of thinking." Frost assef'ts^ ^
th it only past states can ho observed , and adds th it the " I'^ch il-
lusion of psycholO:5.y " is the supposition that ".ve can ::rasp the mo/n-
entiry experience." '^atsoii is strictly opposed to tiie introspective
method, feelini-: sure that no good can ever come from it, md at-
tributing all past serious diffe^'ences of opinions airiong psychol-
o-asts to the inaccuracies of this method.
It ^vill he noticed that the opinion ahoiit introspection varies
from ?il 1 shur/ ' 3 , thit it is as LmpO'^t uit as ohjective methods, to
that held hy Tat.son, fhich in -eality contradicts its ^'ei^/" exist-
ence. Ml of them, though, emphasize the importance of ohjective
met-"iod3--.vhero possible, some siy; in all cases, say other's. The
details of the methods need not detain us, as they are essentially
those of hiology, ma tiose already used in psychological stuaies of
memo ^/ , association, and 1 e i rnl ng
.
At present, the details of the methods iro fitted to the
suh jects, whira a>'."! taken ff'om among the leaver a lmals. Yo'^kes says^''
th it the hoh i-vio-'ists deal so extensi^rjly ^ith the lo^yor animals,
ani 30 little mth laan, hocause it is easier to .vork //ith the ani-
mals, and to control tho he -editar^/- factors. T;io gfoss f icts of be-
havior must he vor'ked out in t.ie animals, since man's '-ime is too
valuable, and he is not so controllable. Litef*, vhen the methods
have been po'-fected, jnan may be expef'imented upon -ilhout so :auch
loss of time, md vdth ''etter resuHs. The question \nses a-: to
•jyhethor the methods worked out in this mangier Till ho suitable for
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iiia/i. Yo-kos raises this qiiojtion, and discussos it V>y toTUn-'; of
ex,j'9''i.iionts o)i h'i>^it-ror;n-iti jn ije*' roamed m.ih the i-mzirw^ mouao; but
ho (loos not izive i direct msN^<\ Th o douhi. implied in the :iuostijn
still rein\ins.
Watson ad/nlts thit the ;nethod3 at pr^esent are not v/oll develoi:)-
ed, but ho propheoL^s that in the cou'^so of time they vill become
so "eflned that anything noAr mvestigatei by introspection, and which
survives the attack of bohT'iorism, can be studied bohavi orLSticalTy-
lIis p'^odictio ^ has been notod that evo/i tiiou-irhts may bo read by re-
cord i.ig throat movements I
The opinions of these psychologists about the elements of
consciousness diffe''. Pa'^ineleo loos not deny the existence of sen-
sations, images, -mi affections; neither* does Pillsbury. -Vatson,
however, declares that there is no such thing as an im-v'^e, and that
feeling is me-'ely the f-esult of ai^tlvity in the sexu J organs and
gl-inds. Sensation is ihe important element in his scheme, though he
does not r^eco nize it as an el '3'nent of consciousness, as such.
In the place of p'osent elements, nothing is sugr^ested, be-
yond the statement that psy cho loyi'^ts -nust talk in t-^f'ms of stimulus
ind response, habit andhe -eiity,
T^at constitutes the bulk of the sub jeot -matte'* of tiis psy-
chology may be deter'mined roughly by noting the chapter-headings of
the fou" books mentioned above,
Pillsbury:- - The Mervous Systei.:, Neural Action in
rolation to Consciousness and '-ehavtor (a study of
habit). Sensation. Sensation and Control (Attention)
Retention -mi ^Association . Perception. Memory md
Ima,-dnation. Instinct. Feelings'. The Kmotio'ns.
Action and .Vill. vVork, Fatigue, and Sleeo.
Intef'relations of Mental Functions. T]io ^elf.
One //ould ha'^dly ''ecognize this book as -emphasizing a ne-v note
in psychology/, altho it is .3ome7/hat diffe<-ent from the chapter-
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headings given in -m old, stiid psycholo^-dcal ioxt-bo.>k.
^TacDoug•il 1 :--The Province of Psycfiolo-'y . The Study
of Conscioiisn-^ss. Ihe Strnicturo of tho Mind. The'
Methods -uid Dep-^rtments of Psyoholopy. 'Iho Study
of Viiml Beh-ivLor'. Ihe Study of CliiTdhood and LndivirJu'-J
Psycholo*;^. ^hnv)rmal ^^sycholoQ^. Social Psyoholo^/.
This author vould include the various hr--inches of psychology'
.V Ich are not dependent upon *he stu:ly of the normal Inaividual.
Panneloe :--The Science of Behavior. Ihe Psycho -cherii ?al
b\sis of Behavior, 'ihe 'Vnatomical and Physiological
Basis of Behavio'^. The Behaviof* of the Lb'/ef* \iiiinaTs.
T»'opisiiis. plvoliition of \niinal behavior. Rvol^^tion
of the Nervous System and Reflex \ction. Function of
the Nervous Syst'em. Cof^ehral Localization.
NatU'*e of Instinct. Meural ^asis of Instinct.
Natu^'o of tntelHgence. Oonsciouoness (Sensation,
attention, pleasi^re^ .-ain, e;f,otioni. Pers nality,
Intelligence, Consciousness and the Natu-'e of the Mind.
In these headings 7/e find tho new note mof'e pr-onounced. However:
,nere are still the old faifiiUa^' topics--tr-oatod in less space, to "be
sure, and from a different point of view.
fat son: --Psychol og;v' '-ind Behavior. Some Problems
Enujiie''ated. Apoaratus and t^ethods. Observational
-md Expe'*i mental Studies uoon Instinct. Concerning
t:ie Origin of Instincts. Experimental Study of
Habit Fo ''mat ion. Fixation o'f \i*cs in Habit.
Ab.nd^mont of tiie beaming Process. Limits of
Training in Ajiimals.
Excepting habit, instinct, and lear'ning, in t'ls treatment tiie
old topics do not appear, ihe change from the old type is he^e com-
p] ete.
Because it is so ne.v, it is hardly a c^'iticism to say t .at it
is almost imposaiblo to determine just what behavior sm is. \n
author should make his book differ fr*om other's in the same field;
but the differences betvveen each of tiiese is gf'eater th-=in should
be expected. For ^illsbun/, it is a shift of emohasi s that does not
change the present general systen. of psychology. For MacDougall,
-
it is an eifiphasis on tiie various branches of psychology ^ Xch study
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rosponaoo md products. For P^pmoloo, It. 300ms to ^o morely 1 pJiaae
of psycho! o.'\y , of sociolo^', an i of physiolop^y in ^vhich ho is inio'*-
estod, and rih\o\i ho thinks is not givon suffioiont attojition -it the
pi'asont tii.;o. Fo'* Nation, it is a comploto shift of ai;a, su>^joct-
inattor, and method; tho constn^ction of a n8.¥ system ;/hich alono
has a ri^ht to bo callod -^sy :hology.
Sinco it is so badly defined, behaviorisir. unist havo x t-7o-fold
justification for interrupting the old system of psychology amidst
its great constn.ctivo po'iod. The behavio^ists musi be more or less
dissatisfied with this old ;)sycno"'ogy ; they must see sifc^is of super-
iority in their new maniior of inte-'p rotation.
i^ione of them aro more severe in their arrifpunont of existing
psychology than is fatson. Its problem, ho says, is the analysis and
synthesi ^ of mental complexes ml elements. It does not consider
tiie objective v/orld, except indirectly. In the fifty-oda years of
its existence it ius failed to tike its place among the othe^ ox-
per'imiental sciences. The results obtained are criticised on the
basis of the experience of the observer -md experimenter*, rather thm
on the basis of the quality oi" tlie apparatus and methods. If re-
sults are not iuplicatod, it is because tiie observe*' is not trained
for noting them ^vhen they come. Psychologists are not on comjnon
ground any longer. "It is questionable whether any one psychologist
can dra.v up a set of statements describing wh it he mean^ by sen-
sation which vvill be agreed to by three other psychologists of
different training. 'One must believe that t.vo hundred years from
now, until introspection is discarded, psychology .111 still be
divided on the question as to whether the'^e is a different textiire
bc5twoen imige and sensation, whether auditorj^ -sensations have the
quality of extension, whetho'' intensity is an attribute which can be
-
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appliod to colo'-, and upon uriny hmidfods of others of Uko Chiractor."
Tiio quOoUon of tho rolatlon of tlio hody md tlio mind constantly
bothers tiioso who aro t'-yin^j, to fonnnlata tfieorlos f'*ojri tids old
point of vie 7. It doe.j not a .mit of a sa; i s facto r\' comparative
psycholor^^ 'becuise all heha^^ior must he into'-preted in tonr.s, of con-
sciousness. "The doctrine which calls for an -analogical intor.jrot-
ation of ill behavior must bo siio^vn to bo falso."
Singer criticises tho tendency lo project consciousness into
animal activity, also. He argues tJiat fc one to apjly the analogj'
method successfully one must know his o vn consciousne .s. are not
sure tint such is tho cise. ^l"i too often, others <^Q\d us >^ettor
th't'i wo road ourselves. 'Hlven if ve did know tho natu^'e of our con-
sciousness, the analogy would be based upon a single case; coulct not
be supported by othoi^ exact kno -ledge; and thorefco vould be value-
less. Thirdly, analogs; could project consciousness whe^o none ox-
Iisted. [fa mechanism could be made so complete and perfect tliat it
would exactly imitate a pr-etty serving-girl, it is hardly conceiv-
able tliat any s.ane man would accept it as a sweetheart; and yet on
the inalogj^ principle, hov could it be known that the mechanism had
no soul capable of loving m return? So lon^ as tho present type
of psychology is retained, this question .vill roiaam unanswered,
and Comparative Psychology to carried on under ^reat difficulties.
Because it takes a definite p^'oblem capable of solution,
because it depends upon oi^jective methods -vhose results are veri-
fiable, because it is not "-othered by any hipeculative theories as to
the connection of body and mind, because it admits of a satisfactory'
Comparative Psychology, beha^aorism does not contain the veaknesses
attributed to p-'esent psycholoi^. Altho weak now, because immature,
at .vill develop rapidly, accomplish unlooked for results, and take

Its j1\cg among otho'- axpe'-imentHl scionoos. Support for such a
p.-jphecy is I'ouna in tho ^^Qt thnt the vicious hr^inchos of psyjhol-
Oi^,' N.iich hiYO sprung off from tho p-\ront ody \r«o no / m a i'Iou^l sh-
in^- conditionf^
[ntrospoctivG psycho! oi^ists do not admit tho sweopin>^ chir^^es
ia\(ie a^ovo. Criticising; Vatson's laagizme af'ticUo, litchonor- points
out that fifty-odd yoars is too short a time to oxpoct exporimental
psychology to hecomo flourishing. Tho^o aro too fo.v .vofkof's in the
field, as comoarod .\-ath physics md chemistry, to accompUsh tho
same quantity of results in the sanie time that these sciences have
secured groat results. Furthermore, ii. is only recently tiiat the
noro complex problerr.s have >:een attacked: jud-mont in 1901; imag-
ination in 1902; conception in 1903; roasoning in 1906. Watson is
anscientific in t{*}/ing to force or hu^ry a conclusion. Shifting the
iiscussion froir point to point is mco essential than forming a
jonclusion, "because the one aevelops the science; whe^oas the other
"otards it. How can one kno</ pain, if all centrally aroused sensat-
.onsare discarded? Connecting all pleasure and pain ^vith the sex-
)rgans seems rather far-fetched. No purer assumption can "be found in
Lntrospective psychology. In formulating his theory of implicit "be-
havior, he forgets that .ifords have meanings also. The detached
branches of psychology defend for their existence upon general psy-
cholog;^'. Meumann in pedagogy. Rive-s in medicine, Stern in testi-
mony, Binet in tests, all aro typical mtrospectiuni sts.
Miss Calkins accuses Watson of tndrig to force his om inclin-
ations and interests upon psychology. He neglects the fact that
introspection can be used to study some kinds of bohavior. She
otos that Yorkes, aoing the same kind of work,- comes out with a
ifferent conclusion because he takes accoiuit of the self.

Yorkos uolntcj out th\i. "the attompt or tondoncy • • -of the stud-
ent of >iohavlor to borrow tiio term psycho! o^/ i'or his sjeci'-il fiold
of >scionca, soaTis to tho ^ritor jyholly unjusti fl-\blo , for tho reason
tii:it if .ve throN ovarbo\''d, a 3 Professor 'Vatsun does, tho metliod of
introspection, together vvith evoi'ything th'it his boon claimed to be
distinctive of the psychologist's point of vio^v and purpose, m shoiilc
consider* the science me-oly i fragment of phy siolo^?'/ , and should
frankly -'ecognizo it as such."
Neglecting the relations.hip of mina ana body does not, oo<^ se,
make results any nio^Q juitifiable. Neglecting any problan th it pro-
perly f ills /dthin psychology' is unscientific; first, because no
scientist shoula be afraid of a task, no jnittor ho v difficult of so--
lution it may seem; and second, because it is illogical to neglect
any factor that may or jiiight have a bearing upon the interpretation
or the securing of data. Asserting that the-'e is no jonsci ousness
seems but a qui^'ble on tenns. Each person kno'wn that he has some-
thing within hiifi that differentiates hi;n from a linotype machine.
James, in the article referred to by F^ost, says that he is me-^ely
largiiing that conscii ousness is not an entity, a ^vhole in itself,
suporiar to the body; that consciousness as a term does stand for
an essential feature of the huiaan machine for which some other naine
;nu3t be obtained if the term consciousness i dropped. If there is
tiiis something atiiin us, neglecting it is not any less foolish than
seeking to determine its nature, even at the risk of scientific
:iuarrels. Tho assumption tiiat /Vatson makes with reference to lang-
jage habits is not supported by one bit of evidence it hand. Dr.
Reed has carried out an experiment in -vhich he found no movements
iuring silent reading, and no simila-^ity of curves for the same mrd
IS pronoujiced by diffe-'-eut people.
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PhUosophor's accapt tho l^ohaviopistic Intorprot \tion bocauao
it londs itsolf hotto'- to prvanitic thoory. oinco tr'ut}i is dopend-
eiit upon o^sorvition, ^hich is so f iully, it vjuld soom to hivo no
socuj^o bisis. But if wh^t one seos as a stimulus c-iusQs, -md is •'o-
cogriizod by, oharac^ a I'i stic movonientj ; then observation, not depend-
ent upoii subjective states, is a solid basis lor tr*uth. lo a nov-
ice in philosophy, this seems like straining at one gnat and Svifallow-
ing '-inothei'. Since porception is so faulty, it is difficult to see
how behaviorism is better than tlio olaer psychological int j-protaticn*
In either- case, tho simple f ict that tiie *e are id stakes cannot be
denied; and so long as it is not possible to ve'ify tlie obser-
vations of some early investigator, tlie truth of a statement i s no
surer by either metiiod of intorp-'etati on.
It must be admitted, of course, that behavion sm is not il to-
gether without bisis. ''}teiiO''ally , Nho^'o the^e a^^e two opposing 'aews,
each side goes to extremes. That is not Hterally the case m tliis
discussion, fatsos Is the only one—at least dth confidence enough
to say so bolaly
—
tf io »7ou1g completely change present psychological
tendencies. There is no introspective psychologist, hov/ever, A^ho
occupies the corrosj^onding oosiiion on the opposite sicie. \11 say
that it has a place, as most behaviorists say that introspection has
a place.
YQvkQs 3 lys that psycliolo^ should study behavior "in its re-
lation to ideas, motives, pu'f'poses and ideals of the organi sm; • • 'a
study .Those goal is tho description of behavior as an expression of
the ivill." It is Aiigell's conclusion that introsoection and be-
la-iorism, each, has a place. fUss Calkins aijnits that \Vat30n is
right in attacking purely abstract study of mental states. IHllsbur/
shows that motor explanations are of value in pointing out that no
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mental st ilo cm bo nnder'stuud in ma of itself, 'iitchonor, thinking,
p'-oh^My, of psychophysics -ind phy sioloi^ical osyciiOlo^n/ , say a that
hah'-ivior-i sm is but the bi .*lo,<^i.cal side of a psychobtulo^^^ "aooirig
oxp^'esslon whe'-e tlio biolo^^ist sees ultimate fact." "It is equally
iiripossible, of covrse, " he says, "mthin the same context of psycho-
id logv', to hive -in independent scionco of psycholog;'/ ; tiio t.vo hal-
ves a^e esseiitial to a single vvholo; -and the psycholor^r of the "^-ehv-
iorist '//ill, in iDattefs of selection, emphasis, a'"r'\n*2;e]nent , tef*m-
inology, perspective, difie'- f^'om genera"' psycholo/^y just as beha^^-
io'Hsm itself diffe-'s f-'on bijlog;^'.''
^it'ioiit question, behaviorism will leave its mark upon psychol-
ogy/, make it loss abstract, and force its attention upon the ,vhole
organism. '.Vitliout ioubt, ' eiiavlorism /ill achieve distinction of its
om; and, it may be, ar^'ive at the definite facts of the control of
behavior that tne average person supposes he can get throu/^h general
psychology mow. Put, as Titchener points out,' whe^'e behaviori s/n
reaches its limit, introspection .^till nil be?4n. Psychology, how-
ever defined, mu^jt study the livings; org'-mism fro.m the standpoint of
motive, expression, and mentality; and ''idiat one knows about one's
omi self--even though it may be but little—cannot ba ruled out
entiroly.
Physics, chemistry, biolo^, and astronoiiiy -vill bear tlie marks
of the present unhoaval Arhen the subject matter is rearraiiged.
Psychology //ill be different because of the influence of behaviori sjh
As we do not expect other sciences to become entirely like the inost
progressive and radical theories forimilated during the period of
change, so do we not expect psycholog;'/ to be replaced ^y the sort
of behavionsm described in t iis discussion as the most radical.
The struggle bet^veon the conservative, dcalistic, forces -and the pro-
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gresslvri, /noiii3i-Lc, forcoa will 5^0 on until tho vio.vi of hotii jidos
li^ivri hoon modi fi-od vid tiio
-ir^ini/nont ovor halvwiorl sui Is drop jod,--
only to br.-jik out -ine./ -^1 .01110 lator d'-ita ovQ'-- spme other pro>vlem
thit tLiB y.3t .vlll reveal.
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Notos 'ind Hofo^oncos.
('inn lLr«st fie^' fe I'efe-'^ to tho nul[l^O'' of tho noto or
refof'onco i. tho ossiy; tho socond fiurn^or' -'ofofs to tho
^ook ' -^riLclo 30'*'*o's )ondin^^ to th-\t nuI:l^O'• in tho ^H^ lio-
griohy; tho t,>iL''d nura^^O'' ''oioi's to tho 0^:0 In th-it article
or f)ook. For oKiifipIo, tho first '•oforofico is to ;JHgo 92 of
'ii\Q ^utUgg^-LJiC^UiaJlj^Qj^jil. P,ayQiia.'U^,>^:- Dos .'sol r . j
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